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Jakarta “Since Yesterday”: The Making of the Post-New 
Order Regime in an Indonesian Metropolis
Arai Kenichiro*
This paper is an attempt to explore the features of Indonesia’s post-New Order 
regime in terms of the reorganization of the spatial, economic, and socio-political 
order in the Jabodetabek region.  Although buoyant property investments in the last 
seven to eight years significantly changed the skyline of the metropolis, this paper 
reveals that the basic pattern did not alter after the regime change, with major 
developers taking control of vast areas of suburban land and creating an oligo polistic 
order.  This paper argues that this continuity was due greatly to the developers’ 
ability to organize and protect their collective interests through business associa-
tions and strong ties with political parties and the administration.  The paper con-
cludes that the emerging new regime comprises privatized urban governance in 
satellite cities, a dual government arrangement, and widening socio-spatial cleav-
ages.  So far, the tension inherent in this arrangement has been contained by mea-
sures such as the privatization of security and the political mobilization of Islam.
Keywords: Jabodetabek, property industry, urban development
Introduction
In this paper, the author presents a political-economic analysis of the making of a new 
urban regime after the collapse of Suharto’s New Order regime in Jakarta and surround-
ing regions—Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi, popularly known in their abbreviated 
form as Jabodetabek.  There are four major questions to be examined, basically corre-
sponding with the four sections of this paper: (1) How, and to what extent, have basic 
patterns of urban development persisted after the regime change?  (2) Why do the dom-
inant development patterns persist even after losing the support of the government?  (3) 
Combining spatial arrangements and socio-economic hierarchy, what kind of new social 
order is in the making?  (4) How does the new regime maintain stability, and what kind 
of dynamism is observed?
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It is an appropriate time to address these questions for several reasons.  First, since 
the collapse of the New Order, 16 years—about half the time of the Suharto presidency—
have elapsed.  The democratized post-New Order phase can no longer be treated as 
transitional.  Second, the past seven or eight years have been a buoyant, booming period 
for the property business, with a number of newly developed apartments, shopping malls, 
large mixed-use complexes (“superblocks”), and gated communities, which have sig-
nificantly changed the landscape of Jabodetabek.
Scholars on Jakarta and other large cities in Southeast Asia have stressed that urban 
spaces and built environments are crucial components in articulating class division and 
other social cleavages,1) and this could have various implications in understanding ongo-
ing political or social developments.  Today, the population of Jakarta is 10 million.  Com-
bined with three surrounding regencies (Tangerang, Bekasi, and Bogor) and several 
municipalities in them, the total population of Jabodetabek is about 28 million: more than 
11 percent of the national population.2)  The heavy weight of the population, together with 
the concentration of economic and political activities in Jakarta as the national capital, 
makes various issues in this region more important than ever—for the whole nation and 
the stability of the post-New Order regime.
This paper is divided into four parts.  First, the author examines preceding studies 
to show that the concentration of land under a small number of developers during the 
New Order was facilitated by Suharto’s authoritarian power, and hence the persistence 
or revival of the oligopoly after the fall of Suharto requires a new explanation about its 
political economy.  The second part examines the continuities and changes in large-scale 
property projects and major developers, and how they retained their control over land 
through the process of democratization.  The third part shows the new social hierarchy 
under the developers’ privatized government, and widening social cleavages.  The last 
part points out several elements of the regime that function to cover social cleavages and 
discontents, and suggests how these cleavages and discontents bring dynamics into urban 
politics under the new democratic framework.  By focusing on the spatial dimensions of 
1) Abidin Kusno in his interpretive study of urban space and architecture has repeatedly addressed 
this issue (Kusno 2000; 2010).  Peter Rimmer and Howard Dick, although approaching the subject 
from a totally different theoretical perspective, also stressed this point in analyzing how the class 
division of large cities in Southeast Asia is spatially articulated (Rimmer and Dick 2009, Chapters 
5 and 8).  Also see the analysis of Malaysia’s Multimedia Super Corridor by Tim Bunnell (2003) and 
Brenda Yeoh’s study on colonial Singapore (2003).
2) If we sum up the population of all regencies and cities in Jabodetabek from the annual report on each 
regency and municipality by BPS (such as Kabupaten Bogor dalam Angka 2011), the total population 
of Jabodetabek in 2010 was 279,426,508.  The population of Jakarta in 2010 was 9,607,787, accord-
ing to BPS (http://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1267, accessed August 27, 2015).
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a political economy perspective, this paper intends to contribute to a better understand-
ing of the post-New Order regime, of its features, tensions, and resilience.
I Contextualizing Jabodetabek in the Making of the Post-New Order 
Regime
Jakarta is surrounded by three regencies: Bogor to the south, Tangerang to the west, 
and Bekasi to the east.  Although suburbanization and deconcentration have extended 
the metropolitan region in all three directions, each direction is characterized by different 
dominant patterns of suburbanization.  The south was the most natural area for subur-
banization and the formation of a satellite city since the Dutch colonial period, but this 
trend was intentionally curbed from the 1970s and 1980s because the southern highland 
functions as the water catchment area for the capital city.  Since the second half of the 
1980s, westward development has been propelled mainly by planned satellite city projects 
(mainly residential ones), while eastward development has been propelled by large-scale 
industrial estate projects (Arai 2011).
Several studies on urban development during the New Order are available as a 
starting point to assess the continuity and change before and after the regime change. 
Among them are Andrinof Chaniago’s fairly comprehensive analysis on the failure of 
urban development during the New Order (2001); Robert Cowherd’s studies on the 
political economy and the politics of hegemonic discourse in the implementation and 
distortion of city planning (2002; 2005; 2008); Tommy Firman’s series of studies on the 
development in the Jakarta metropolitan region (for example, Firman 2004; 2014; Salim 
and Firman 2011); Bernard Dorleans’s studies on changes in land use, land transaction, 
and speculation (1994; 2000); and large-scale, multifaceted joint research on Jakarta con-
ducted by Osaka City University (Miyamoto and Konagaya 1999).  Previous work by this 
author (2005) also analyzed the birth and development of about two dozen large-scale 
satellite city projects: how these projects were conceived, and how vast spreads of sub-
urban land were consolidated and controlled by a small number of private developers 
(also Arai 1999; 2001a; 2001b; 2012).
Although varied in approach and focus, preceding studies on Jabodetabek urban 
development have generally focused on the development of either industrial estates or 
predominantly residential satellite city projects.  For example, while Chaniago (2001) 
stressed the deregulation of industrial estate development at the end of the 1980s as the 
major momentum to open up widespread land speculation and the commoditization of 
urban space, the author of this paper, along with Firman (2004) and Cowherd (2005), put 
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a greater focus on large-scale satellite city projects as a dominant factor in shaping the 
spatial order of Jabodetabek (Arai 2005; 2012).
These satellite cities indeed deserve special attention in analyzing the spatial trans-
formation of Jabodetabek during Suharto’s New Order era.  First, the scale of land appro-
priation was unusual, especially in the context of densely populated Java.  Combined 
together, these projects were sanctioned by development permits that covered roughly 
80,000 hectares of land in this region—roughly 12 percent of the whole Jabodetabek area 
(663,900 hectares)—and the 22 percent of the area in Bodetabek designated for residen-
tial use in the government’s spatial plans (370,716 hectares).  Second, these planned 
cities were developed as a private business, mainly by ethnic Chinese conglomerates. 
This meant that a small number of private businesses were in a position to decisively 
influence the land and residential market of the whole metropolitan region, and hence 
established oligopolistic market structure.
Observers generally agree that the New Order’s policy promoting privately devel-
oped large satellite cities had a serious negative impact on the economy and society.  It 
exacerbated land speculation, funded by mushrooming new banks and a buoyant capital 
market.  Skyrocketing land prices made affordable housing unviable and at the same time 
aggravated social discrepancy and antagonism.  Newly developed houses were generally 
targeted at a small market of the middle to upper classes and caused oversupply while 
excluding and alienating the lower classes.  Overinvestment in land and property, financed 
by reckless bank loans, and the resulting massive nonperforming loans became one of 
the most consequential factors of the economic crisis in 1997.  Many large corporations 
experienced de facto bankruptcy.  Nonperforming loans of roughly Rp.70 trillion were 
then transferred from the private sector to the government.  By setting up the Indo-
nesia Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA in English, BPPN in Indonesian), the state 
managed to recover only about 30 percent of the funds already invested to salvage the 
banks; the burden of the remaining 70 percent—roughly Rp.50 trillion—of nonperform-
ing loans from the property sector ultimately fell on taxpayers.  In terms of results, only 
land resources and profits were privatized; the cost of the failure was borne by the 
 public sector.  Neither did these satellite city projects succeed in the task of providing 
a large number of houses to the majority of urban residents at an affordable price (Arai 
2005).
In tracking how a small number of developers got such a vast spread of land under 
their control, previous studies pointed out the crucial role of the permits issued by the 
government, especially izin lokasi, or location permits (Cowherd 2002; 2008; Firman 
2004; Arai 2005; Rakodi and Firman 2009).  In a country where land titles are not well 
registered and are blurred and multilayered by the complex history of colonialism, 
Jakarta “Since Yesterday” 449
revolu tion, and widespread squatting, legal rights on certain pieces of land stand on a 
fragile base.  Control over land is often determined by which of the contesting stake-
holders has the most power.  During the New Order, location permits sanctioned by 
the authoritarian government gave developers (permit holders) the exclusive right to 
buy, keep, and develop land, thus leaving landholders with almost minimal bargaining 
power.
However, scholars differ in their view of why location permits were overissued. 
Firman (2004) stressed the speculative behavior of developers on the one hand, and an 
uncontrolled land permit system on the other, by both the National Land Agency (Badan 
Pertanahan Nasional, BPN) and local governments.  He also pointed out that local govern-
ments had very weak capacity for managing and implementing spatial plans.  This expla-
nation stresses the weakness of the government (in terms of capacity or discipline) 
vis-à-vis private developers (see also Firman 2009, 332).  Although this author agrees 
with each point of the above explanation, Firman stops short of explaining why the gov-
ernment was powerful in raising the position of permit holders vis-à-vis landholders while 
being weak in controlling the same permit holders it empowered.
Cowherd (2005) and Arai (2005) took the opposite view in stressing that the strong 
power of the government was a precondition of this process: developers were able to 
appropriate disproportionate amounts of land resources mainly because they were 
empowered and supported by the strong authority of the government.  Although the 
resulting land-use patterns often deviated from what was officially planned, developers 
received extensive support from the government; in this sense, these deviations were 
intentionally overlooked (Arai 2005).  A fuller explanation of this historical process has 
to include an analysis of the government-business relationship and internal differences 
of interest within the government.  The political economy approach is well suited to this 
task.
Takashi Shiraishi (1992) pointed out the dual foundation of Suharto’s New Order 
regime: the formal, functional hierarchy of bureaucracy, and the informal, patron-client 
hierarchy that was justified with the ideology equating the state with a large family. 
Suharto stood at the top of both hierarchies.  Spatially, the apex of the formal one was 
the presidential office, and that of the informal one was Suharto’s private residence on 
Cendana Street in Menteng, Central Jakarta.  Members of the most privileged inner 
circle of this informal hierarchy were allowed to meet him privately in his Cendana home. 
Initially, Suharto skillfully manipulated these formal and informal aspects.  However, as 
with the generational change within the body of bureaucracy and wider socioeconomic 
transformation, the two logics increasingly came apart and generated tension and conflict 
in the late 1980s and 1990s (ibid.).  From this perspective, many of the policies of eco-
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nomic liberalization and private-sector-driven development actually functioned for the 
members of the informal network to utilize the state’s formal apparatus to maximize their 
chances of rent seeking, appropriating public resources, and accumulating wealth outside 
of the bureaucracy in the form of privatized capital.  Cowherd took a similar view in 
analyzing urban development in the New Order era, naming the informal ruling elites the 
“Cendana-Cukong alliance” (Cowherd 2005).
Based on these previous studies, the question remains: If oligopolistic control was 
enabled and sustained by Suharto’s Cendana-Cukong alliance, why and how did it sustain 
itself or change after the fall of Suharto?  Firman’s 2004 study presented the case that 
successful new-town developers were securing the support of the growing middle to 
upper strata by providing them with high security, good urban management, and the 
image of a modern lifestyle (Firman 2004).  He discussed this topic in terms of segrega-
tion, but what he observed can also be framed as a “developer-middle class alliance” and 
counted as an alternative-support base for developers in the post-New Order era.  This 
author finds it helpful in the following analysis.  Cowherd did not try to extend his analy-
sis in detail into the post-New Order era but hinted at the binding power of the discourse 
of “development” as an important factor in the continuity before and after the regime 
change (Cowherd 2008).  Firman’s more recent studies, together with the works of 
D. Hudalah and other scholars, seem to shift attention and effort into revealing the grow-
ing weight of new industrial centers in the Jakarta metropolitan region, and the emerging 
polycentric metropolitan structure (Hudalah and Firman 2012; Hudalah et al. 2013; 
 Firman 2014).  Although these are important issues in themselves, the analyses tend to 
bypass the issue of power relations, naturalizing the observed phenomena by relating 
them to some global trend or force (such as post-suburbanization and FDI of globally 
mobile capital) on the one hand, and the trend of deconcentration of industrial investment 
and employment on the other.
Just as the concentration of land under the New Order regime was not a natural or 
inevitable process, its continuation after the collapse of the Cendana-Cukong alliance is 
also not natural but needs explanation.  This paper tries to present a brief outline of how 
the restructuring of social hegemony and spatial order in the post-New Order era rein-
force each another, and how they guarantee the continuation of the highly oligopolistic 
control of land resources.  This paper also argues that privatized security and the result-
ing employment opportunities as well as the political mobilization of Islam constitute 
important pillars of the post-New Order regime and guarantee a certain degree of social 
stability amid a polarized economic and spatial structure.
On the aspect of change, this paper maintains that the contemporary metropolitan 
order is ruled by a restructured growth coalition characterized by a more formalized 
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relationship between the government and the property business, and a highly commer-
cialized relationship between privatized “municipal governments” and the wealthy mid-
dle to upper classes.
II Reorganizing Oligopoly
1 Planned Satellite City Projects Revisited
The first question to be asked is how and to what extent the oligopolistic control of land 
has changed since the regime change.  This author tracks major satellite city projects 
after the New Order (Table 1; Map 1).  Just after the economic crisis and the collapse of 
the New Order, almost all large developers became temporarily insolvent, and the 
government —as creditor—had strong bargaining power against them.  At that time, the 
BPN expressed the intent to review the appropriateness of existing development permits 
of large satellite city projects.  However, Table 1 shows that most satellite city projects 
have survived, albeit with some changes in shareholders.  As for projects of more than 
Map 1 Large-Scale Satellite City Projects in Jabodetabek
Source: Made by the author
Note: Numbers in this map correspond with those of Table 1.
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Table 1 Large-Scale Satellite City Projects in Jabodetabek (>500 ha)
No.
New Order Post New Order Planned Total Size (ha)
Place
Name of City Developer Name of City Developer Suharto Regime 2007
1 Pantai Indah Kapuk




PT Mandara Permai (Berca 
Group), Agung Sedayu 
Group
800 Penjaringan North Jakarta
2 Modern Jakarta PT. Modernland Realty
Jakarta 
Garden City
Keppel Land & PT. 
Modernland Realty 500 270 Cakung East Jakarta




4 Bumi Serpong Damai
PT BSD (Salim, Sinar Mas, 
Ciputra) BSD City
PT Bumi Serpong Damai 
(Sinarmas Land) 6,000 6,000 Serpong
5 Alam Sutera PT Alfa Goldland Realty (Argo Manunggal Group) Alam Sutera
PT Alam Sutera Realty Tbk 
(Argo Manunggal Group) 700 700
Serpong 
Utara




PT Jakarta Baru Cosmopolitan 
(Summarecon Group, Batik 












Development 600 Kelapa Dua
9 Lippo Karawaci PT Lippoland Development
Lippo 
Karawaci PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk 2,000 2,266 Kelapa Dua
10 Citra Raya Ciputra Group Citra Raya Ciputra Group 1,000 2,760 Cikupa
11 Kota Tigaraksa PT Panca Wiratama Sakti –
n.a. (Tangerang Regency 
Government) 3,000 – Tigaraksa
12 Kota Wisata Teluk Naga Salim Group – – 8,000 – Teluknaga
13 Puri Jaya PT Jaya Real Property Puri Jaya PT Jaya Real Property 1,745 n.a. Pasar Kemis
14 Kota Legenda
PT Putra Alvita Pratama 
(Napan, Puteraco, Bangun 
Tjipta Pratama,Duta Putra 
Mahkota, Kalbe Land, 
Dharmala Group, Pangestu 
family)





15 Lippo Cikarang PT Lippoland Development
Lippo 
Cikarang PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk 5,400 2,216
Cikarang 
Selatan
16 Cikarang Baru PT Grahabuana Cikarang
Kota 










PT Kawasan Industri 
Jababeka Tbk (Sudwikatmono 
and others)
2,140





19 Pantai Modern PT Modernland Realty – – 500 – Tarumajaya
Bekasi 
Municipality20 Harapan Indah PT Hasana Damai Putra Kota Harapan Indah
PT Hasana Damai Putra 
(Damai Putra Group) 700 3,000
Medan 
Satria
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1,000 ha, 10 old projects have survived or been revived (sometimes, completely rede-
signed and rebranded)—Bintaro Jaya, BSD City, Lippo Karawaci, Citra Raya, Grand 
Wisata, Lippo Cikarang, Kota Jababeka, Sentul City, Citra Indah, and Sentul Nirwana,3)—
3) Grand Wisata, although succeeding to the land-bank of former Kota Legenda project, is being mar-
keted as a totally new project.  Sentul Nirwana (formerly Bukit Jonggol Asri) was launched in 2010, 
after the Bakrie Group had bought up a significant portion of the shares of PT Bukit Jonggol Asri 
and its parent company, PT Sentul City.  However, the Bakrie Group then fell into financial difficul-
ties and had to give up most of the shares.  In 2014 the Corruption Eradication Commission arrested 
the director of the company along with the governor of Bogor, Rahmat Yasin, on corruption charges. 
Because of these negative events, it is unlikely that this project, still composed of only a few resi-
dential clusters, will develop into a true satellite city in the near future.
Table 1 continued
No.
New Order Post New Order Planned Total Size (ha)
Place
Name of City Developer Name of City Developer Suharto Regime 2007
21 Kota Wisata




PT Duta Pertiwi 
(Sinarmas), Marubeni, LG, 





22 – – Legenda Wisata




Metropolitan PT Metropolitan Land
Metland 
Transyogi
PT Metropolitan Land 600
148
Cileungsi
24 Metland Cileungsi 200
25 – – Harvest City
PT Dwikarya Langgeng 






PT Royal Sentul Highland 
(Bambang Trihatmodjo & 
Cahyadi Kumala)
Sentul City
PT Sentul City Tbk 
(Bakrieland Development, 
Kumala family & others)
2,000 3,100 Babakan Madang
27 Bukit Jonggol Asri
PT Bukit Jonggol Asri 
(Bambang Trihatmodjo, 
Cahyadi Kumala, Haryadi 
Kumala)
Sentul 
Nirwana Bakrieland Development 30,000 12,000 Jonggol
28 Citra Indah Ciputra Group Citra Indah Ciputra Group 1,000 1,200 Jonggol
29 Telaga Kahuripan
PT Kuripan Raya (Duta Putra, 




PT Kuripan Raya (Duta 
Putra, Napan, Kalbe, 
Dharmala, Eka Anugrah)
750 750 Parung
30 Rancamaya PT Suryamas Duta Makmur Rancamaya Golf Estate
PT Suryamas Dutamakmur 
Tbk 500 325 Ciawi
31 Kota Tenjo BHS Land – – 3,000 – Tenjo








Municipality33 Graha Bogor Indah Sanggraha Pelita Sentosa 57
Source: Made by the author.  As for the New Order era, basically based on the data from Properti Indonesia (April 1997, 241), 
and supplemented with other sources such as Top Tokoh Properti Indonesia & Karya-Karyanya (1997), and Rumah 
Untuk Anda: Direktori Proyek-Proyek Real- Estate di Indonesia (1997).  As for the Post-New Order era, compiled by 
the author based on the data from the backnumbers of Properti Indonesia (especially [Properti Indonesia March 2007]) 
and supplemented with various other sources such as Direktori Perumahan (Serpong, Cibubur, Depok + Bogor, 
Bekasi) and the websites of the developers and projects.
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while another project (Kota Harapan Indah) has been significantly scaled up, and other 
two projects (Kota Deltamas and Harvest City) were newly started in the post-New Order 
era.  As for projects between 500 ha and 1,000 ha, seven have survived or been revived—
Pantai Indah Kapuk, Alam Sutera, Kota Modern, Gading Serpong, Kota Wisata, Bogor 
Nirwana Residence and, (although with a doubtful prospect) Telaga Kahuripan.4)  Only 
three projects have been significantly scaled down to below 500 ha—Jakarta Garden City, 
Metland Transyogi & Metland Cileungsi, and Rancamaya Golf Estate, while five projects 
have disappeared or totally stalled—Kota Tigaraksa, Kota Wisata Teluk Naga, Pantai 
Modern, Kota Tenjo, and Puri Jaya.5)
Why have so many projects survived?  First, during its most difficult and fragile 
period—between 1998 and 2004—the government prioritized the recovery of public 
money over the need for radical revision of urban development policy, such as setting up 
publicly managed land banks for securing the land to provide enough affordable public 
housing.  The mission of IBRA was to recover as much public money as possible and 
return it to the government coffers—and thus to help finance the governmental budget—
not to formulate an alternative blueprint for Jabodetabek development.  Therefore, 
property- related assets under IBRA were quickly auctioned, while large and well- 
connected debtors were not robbed of their profitability but only prompted to restructure 
their debt into a sustainable level.  The logical consequence was that the regional resi-
dential market today is as oligopolistic as in the New Order era, and the developers’ 
position is even better after their debt has been restructured to a sustainable level.
Table 2 shows some of the 150 wealthiest businessmen from the 2007 Globe Asia 
magazine.  This selection omits those whose business does not include property as a 
major line of business.6)  In the post-New Order era, Sinarmas has become the largest 
property developer in all of Jabodetabek.  The group manages Kota Wisata and Legenda 
Wisata in Bogor, BSD City in Tangerang, and Grand Wisata and Kota Deltamas in Bekasi. 
With these mega projects in all three regencies in Bodetabek, the group’s influence on 
4) Gading Serpong is now being developed by two separate developers, but it retains coherence as a 
single satellite city.  Telaga Kahuripan, although still exists and is being marketed, has long been 
stagnant and remains an ordinary housing estate.
5) Very recently, Jaya Real Property started developing a housing estate named Grand Batavia in Pasar 
Kemis, Tangerang, probably using a land-bank for Puri Jaya project.  However, this is a quite recent 
event and this author does not have data whether this project signals the rebirth of long-stalled Puri 
Jaya.
6) Members of the Suharto family (Hutomo Mandara Putra, Bambang Trihatmodjo, Sudwikatmono, 
Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, and Probosutejo) and those who engaged in business with the Suharto 
family (Ibrahim Risjad) are underlined and also included in the excerpt, although they are not 
extensively engaged in the property business any more.
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Table 2 Property-Business-Related Super Rich among in the Top 150 Wealthiest Indonesian Businessmen
Rank Name Company Net Worth  US$, million Business
1 Budi Hartono Djarum 4,200 Cigarettes, banking, property
3 Eka Tjipta Widjaja Sinar Mas 3100 Palm oil, pulp & paper, finance, property
4 Sudono Salim Salim Group 2,800 Food, palm oil, telecommunication, property
8 Aburizal Bakrie Bakrie Group 1,050 Energy, property, telecommunication
14 Mochtar Riady Lippo Group 585 Property, retail, healthcare
20 Trihatma Haliman Agung Podomoro Group 505 Property
23 Osbert Lyman Satya Djaja Raya 400 Timber, property
26 Dasuki Angkosubroto Gunung Sewu Group 365 Manufacturing, property
27 Murdaya Poo Berca Group 350 Manufacturing, property
29 Jan Darmadi Darmadi Corp. 340 Property
30 Ciputra Ciputra Development 335 Property
37 Eka Tjandranegara Mulia Group 278 Property
38 Sugianto Kusma Agung Sedayu 275 Property
39 Alexander Tedja Pakuwon 270 Property, malls
41 The Ning King Argo Pantes Group 260 Textile, property
49 Handojo Santosa Ometraco 240 Feed mill, property
50 Henry Onggo Ratu Sayang Group 235 Property
52 Didi Darwis Ling Brothers 225 Investment, property
53 Hutomo Mandara Putra Humpass 220 Shipping
54 Soetjipto Nagaria Summarecon 213 Property
55 Mu’min Ali Gunawan Panin 210 Banking, property
61 Ginawan Tjondro CNI 170 Consumer goods, property
62 Rudy Suliawan Mid Plaza 165 Property
65 Bambang Trihatmodjo Global Media Com 160 Media
68 Luntungan Honoris Modern Group 156 Property, Fujifilm
70 Soedjono Wirasakti Adimulya 150 Property
77 Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono Sultan of Yogyakarta 140 Property
80 Cahyadi Kumala Bukit Sentul 130 Property
82 G.Lukman Pudjiadi Jayakarta Group 128 Property, hotels
85 Pontjo Sutowo Nugra Sentana Group 125 Property, hotels
91 Sukamdani Gitosardjono Sahid Group 110 Property, hotels
93 Sudwikatmono Indika Group 110 Entertainment
95 GS Margono Gapura Prima 110 Property
103 A Siang Rusli Kurnia Tetap Mulia 98 Entertainment, property
106 Siti Hardijanti Rukmana Citra Lamtoro Gung 90 Investment
108 Putra Masagung Gunung Agung 90 Book store, property
110 Ibrahim Risjad Risjadson 90 Investment
111 Hendro Gondokusumo Dharmala Intiland 87 Property
117 Kahardin Ongko Ongko Group 85 Property, ceramics
118 Benjamin Soeryadjaya Surya Internusa 85 Property, finance
130 SD Darmono Jababeka 70 Property
133 MS Hidayat MSH Group 70 Property
138 Hendro Setiawan Pikko Group 63 Property
139 Bambang Wiyogo Kuningan Protama 62 Property
140 Probosutejo Mercu Buana Group 61 Property
143 Frans Siswanto Saka Agung Abadi 58 Property
Source: Edited from Globe Asia (August 2007, 130–134)
Note: Underlined are the business of Suharto’s family members and those most closely related during the 
New Order era.
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the landed residential market is stronger than any other developers operating in 
 Bodetabek.7)  In 2010 the group consolidated all these projects under a new umbrella 
company, Sinarmas Land, and located the national headquarters in BSD City.8)
The Summarecon Group has also risen to be a major player.  After garnering huge 
profits from various projects in Kelapa Gading (North Jakarta), the group succeeded in 
revitalizing the once-stagnant Gading Serpong project in Tangerang and is currently 
developing a new project in Bekasi (Summarecon Bekasi, 240 ha).  The Paramount Group 
from Singapore has joined in the development of Gading Serpong by purchasing the share 
previously owned by Batik Keris.
In Bekasi, Kota Jababeka (Cikarang area) and Kota Harpan Indah (Bekasi Munici-
pality) have emerged as unique and influential players.  Bekasi is characterized by the 
presence of several huge industrial estates and is becoming the industrial heartland of 
Indonesia.  Since a substantial number of factory workers migrated to Bekasi, both Kota 
Jababeka and Kota Harapan Indah until recently grew by marketing relatively affordable 
housing to factory workers.  In the case of Kota Jababeka, the developer also operates 
one industrial estate, contributing to make Cikarang the industrial center of Bekasi 
(Hudalah and Firman 2012).  As a result, the class compositions of these satellite cities 
look more balanced and less exclusive than those in Tangerang or Bogor.
In contrast to these “winners,” some business groups have largely dropped out of 
the property business in Jabodetabek after the New Order.  The Salim Group has lost its 
share in major property projects in Jabodetabek—such as Bumi Serpong Damai, Pondok 
Indah, Puri Indah, and Pantai Indah Kapuk—and largely withdrawn from the business 
landscape.  The group’s shares in these projects were acquired by the Berca Group 
(headed by Murdaya Poo).  The acquisition of these projects made Murdaya Poo one of 
the emerging property tycoons in the property industry in Jabodetabek.  With the decline 
of the Salim Group, Ciputra, once renowned as the property king, also lost management 
control of projects such as Pondok Indah, BSD, Pantai Indah Kapuk, and Puri Indah. 
Ciputra’s family gave up most of the remaining shares in these projects during the 
restructuring process in order to save the projects of their own family business, the 
Ciputra Group.  As far as the Jabodetabek region is concerned, the group’s projects are 
7) The Sinarmas Group developed Banjar Wijaya in Tangerang City, Telaga Golf Sawangan in Depok 
City, and Kota Bunga in Bogor (Puncak area).  These are smaller than 500 ha, so they were not 
included in Table 1.  See Properti Indonesia (March 2004).
8) The company is listed on the Singapore Exchange and headquartered in Singapore on paper, but 
the company’s projects outside Indonesia are almost negligible.  For the company’s projects in 
Indonesia, Singapore, China, and Malaysia, see the company’s annual report (Sinarmas Land Limited 
2012) and homepage (www.sinarmasland.com, accessed October 6, 2015).
Jakarta “Since Yesterday” 457
either too peripherally located (Citra Raya and Citra Indah) or too piecemeal (Citra 
 Garden Estate and Citra Gran) for it to be regarded as a dominant player.  However, this 
does not mean the decline of the group itself.  It has rapidly expanded business into the 
residential markets of dozens of smaller provincial cities in the whole of Indonesia, such 
as Surabaya, Semarang, Pekalongan, Sidoarjo (Jawa), Balikpapan, Banjarmasin 
 (Kalimantan), Lampung, Medan, Pekanbaru (Sumatra), Makassar, Manado, Gowa, 
(Sulawesi), and Ambon (Maluku).9)
The children of former President Suharto have largely exited from the property 
business in Jabodetabek.  During the New Order, Bambang Trihatmodjo was engaged in 
large-scale projects such as Bukit Sentul and Bukit Jonggol Asri in Bogor regency 
 (Properti Indonesia March 1996, 20–27; August 1997, 36; November 1998, 20; Soesilo 
1998, 134).  In 2010, the Bakrie Group bought significant shares of both of these pro-
jects and announced that it would develop the 12,000 ha Sentul Nirwana satellite city in 
 Jonggol (Properti Indonesia February 2011, 20), only to release it again amid the group’s 
financial difficulty and scandal over development permits.10)
2 Back to the City: Apartment Business in the Center of Jakarta
One of the new and important developments of the post-New Order metropolitan region 
is the rapid proliferation of high-rise apartments.  During the New Order, even at its peak 
in the mid-1990s, the annual supply of apartments was at best a few thousand units.  The 
cumulative supply of apartments throughout the three decades of the New Order era 
was at most about 20,000 units, mostly targeted at the rental market for expatriates, and 
therefore had a relatively negligible impact on the general housing condition in 
 Jabodetabek.11)  However, with the worsening of traffic congestion, apartments built at 
strategic locations in or near the center of Jakarta are gaining in popularity among those 
who work in Jakarta.  New developments in the post-New Order era have proliferated, 
with the cumulative supply of strata-title apartments in 2012 already reaching more than 
100,000 units (Colliers International 2012).  Although the majority of middle classes still 
prefer a landed house, living in a high-rise apartment is rapidly becoming part of a normal 
9) See www.ciputra.com for the group’s multiple projects spread all over Indonesia (Accessed October 
6, 2015).  Also see Bisnis Properti (March 2004) and Properti Indonesia (October 2011) for the busi-
ness strategies of the Ciputra Group in the post-New Order period.
10) “Kasus suap bupati Bogor, Bakrie kembalikan Bukit Jonggol ke Sentul City” (DetikNews, May 9, 
2014, accessed September 23, 2015) [http://news.detik.com/berita/2578098/kasus-suap-bupati-
bogor-bakrie-kembalikan-bukit-jonggol-ke-sentul-city-tahun-lalu].
11) For a fairly comprehensive list of apartment developments during the New Order, see Properti 
Indonesia (June 1997, 24).
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lifestyle in Jakarta.12)
Within the apartment industry of the post-New Order era, the most conspicuous 
phenomenon is the rise of the Agung Podomoro Group.  As one of the relatively old play-
ers, the group itself was established in the 1970s through the development of landed 
housing estates in places such as Sunter, North Jakarta.  Around the year 2000, when 
many developers were still struggling with debt restructuring, the group succeeded in 
developing and marketing a new and exclusive housing estate, Bukit Gading Mediterania, 
in Kelapa Gading, North Jakarta.  However, the real breakthrough for the group came 
when it concentrated its resources into the development of high-rise apartment projects. 
Mainly through the brand name of Mediterania apartments, the group became the top 
apartment developer by providing a massive quantity of small-sized apartment units 
(36–54 m2) at a relatively low price.  Since around 2004, the group has succeeded in sell-
ing these apartments to the lower middle-strata market in places such as Tanjung Duren, 
Kemayoran, Ancol, Kelapa Gading, Sudirman, Kalibata, and so on.13)
Another important player in the apartment sector is the Bakrie Group, which entered 
the apartment market in 1993 when it launched Taman Rasuna Apartments (Arai 2001b, 
489).  The group’s apartment projects are concentrated in about 53 ha of land near Rasuna 
Said Road.  In the post-New Order era, the group renamed the area Rasuna Epicentrum 
and marketed new apartment towers, such as The 18th Residence, The Wave, Grove, 
and so on.  However, currently the group is heavily in debt and selling remaining land 
stocks to other developers, such as the Sinarmas Group.14)
12) In 2011, Weekly NNA Consum magazine conducted a survey on 100 white-collar workers aged older 
than 20 (both male and female) who lived and worked in Jabodetabek.  Asked what kind of house 
they hoped to live in, the majority of respondents chose a landed house with two floors (60 percent) 
or a single floor (31 percent).  Only 1 percent answered that they hoped to live in an apartment, 
testifying to the strong desire to live in landed houses (The Weekly NNA Consum, October 21, 2011. 
No. 159, 5).
13) Gading Mediterania Residences (Kelapa Gading, North Jakarta, 1,650 units), Mediterania Boulevard 
Residences & Mediterania Lagoon Residences (Kemayoran, Central Jakarta, about 1,200 units), 
Mediterania Garden Residences I, II (Tanjung Duren, West Jakarta, about 5,700 units; more than 
8,000 units in Podomoro City superblock as a whole), Mediterania Marina Residences (Ancol, North 
Jakarta, 1,900 units).  Sudirman Park (Jl K.H. Mangsyur, Central Jakarta, 1,500 units) is also one of 
the group’s project with a similar price range, although it is not branded as “Mediterania.”  For the 
details of the group’s major projects, see Signature Properties in Jakarta (2010), the group’s official 
website (www.agungpodomoro.com, accessed October 6, 2015), and several real-estate directories. 
For the phenomenal growth of the Agung Podomoro Group in the post-New Order era, see Bisnis 
Properti (February 2004, 12–26).
14) The Bakrie Group sold 3 ha to the Tiara Marga Trakindo Group in 2011, and another 5 ha to PT 
Bumi Serpong Damai Tbk under the Sinarmas Group in 2014 (“Lima indikasi bangkrutnya Bakrie,” 
Merdeka.com, February 12, 2014, accessed September 23, 2015, http://www.merdeka.com/uang/5-
indikasi-bangkrutnya-bakrie.html).
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Another noticeable development in the post-New Order period is the growth of 
sub-CBD (central business district) areas outside of the golden triangle, including the 
areas alongside T.B. Simatupang Road, Pondok Indah, and Kemang in South Jakarta; 
Kembangan/Puri Indah in West Jakarta; and Pluit and Kelapa Gading in North Jakarta. 
These places have one common feature: in the late New Order era, all were well-known 
as relatively tranquil suburban residential areas for the upper class, although there were 
also some non-residential facilities such as shopping malls.  However, with the rapid 
increase of the commuter population in the Bodetabek satellite cities, the worsening of 
traffic congestion, and the steep rise of property prices in the CBD area, developers are 
targeting these areas as the next growth centers and equipping them with new office 
buildings, apartments, and ambitious mixed-use complexes.
The most prominent actor in these areas is the Lippo Group.  The group grew first 
as a major private bank in the 1980s and then entered the property development business 
in the early 1990s.  Lippo Karawaci (Tangerang) and Lippo Cikarang (Bekasi) are two of 
the most prestigious satellite city projects in Jabodetabek.  Through the development of 
these projects, the group acquired various new lines of business catering to upper- to 
middle-class residents, such as a department store (Matahari), hotel (Aryaduta), private 
school (Pelita Harapan), and hospital (Siloam).  It added a bookstore chain (Times book-
store), an English newspaper and magazine publishing company (Globe Asia), and even 
a cemetery business (San Diego Hills).  The group is most competitive when combining 
these various businesses together into one township and creating synergistic effects.  In 
the post-New Order period the group applies a similar strategy, but not by developing 
new satellite cities (which would require acquiring hundreds of hectares of land); rather, 
it develops high-rise mixed-use complexes.  The group’s recent projects include Kemang 
Village (Kemang, South Jakarta), St. Moritz (Kembangan/Puri Indah, West Jakarta), and 
Holland Village (Cempaka Putih, Central Jakarta).15)  The Pondok Indah Group, which 
was controlled by the Salim Group and then acquired by the Murdaya family, is also 
engaged in ambitious CBD developments in both Pondok Indah (South Jakarta) and Kem-
bangan/Puri Indah (West Jakarta).16)
This section has examined the continuities and changes in major satellite city proj-
ects and dominant developers.  Although the dominant trend is that of modified continu-
15) For the Lippo Group’s major activities since the first decade of the twenty-first century, see Globe 
Asia (August 2007, 162–166), the annual reports of Lippo Karawaci Tbk, and the company’s website 
(www.lippokarawaci.co.id, accessed October 6, 2015).
16) The group is developing Pondok Indah through PT Metropolitan Kentjana while developing the 
Kembangan area through PT Antilope Madju Puri Indah.  See the official website of Pondok Indah 
Group (www.pondokindahgroup.co.id, accessed October 6, 2015).
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ity, there are some interesting changes that also deserve attention.  During the New 
Order era, almost all the big business groups tried to engage in large-scale satellite city 
projects.  In the post-New Order era, each developer tends to focus on a specific sector 
in which to concentrate its resources and to have a competitive edge over its rivals.  The 
Sinarmas Group is dominant in large-scale satellite city projects in Bodetabek, while the 
Lippo Group focuses on high-rise mixed-use projects in new CBD areas, the Agung 
Podomoro Group on high-rise apartments, and the Ciputra Group on dozens of residen-
tial projects in many provincial cities in Indonesia.
3 Adapting to Parliamentary Democracy
After learning about the resilience of major satellite city projects and prominent develop-
ers, the next question is why their dominance persists even after the collapse of the 
Cendana-Cukong alliance.  One of the key factors is that a formal channel between devel-
opers and policy makers, such as business associations and parliament, has replaced the 
informal Cendana-Cukong alliance of the New Order era.
First, developers today can protect their collective interests by negotiating through 
formal business associations.  In fact, REI (Real Estate Indonesia) has grown to be one 
of the best-organized business associations since the New Order era.  Its leadership posts 
have also functioned as an entry into a political career for ambitious businessmen (such 
as Siswono Yudohusodo, Mohamad S. Hidayat, and Enggartiasto Lukita) (Arai 2012, 
Chapter 5).
Second, developers have strong supporters within parliament.  While most political 
parties are, by and large, accommodating to the interests of large business groups, espe-
cially interesting is the reorganization and resurgence of Golkar (Golongan Karya) from 
the rubber-stamp machine of the New Order regime to a major political party (Partai 
Golkar).  What was salient through this reorganization process was that those who had 
strong ties with large business groups (such as Akbar Tanjung, Jusuf Kalla, Aburizal 
Bakrie, Mohamad S. Hidayat, and Enggartiasto Lukita) acquired prominent political posi-
tions (ibid.).  Even though Golkar has lost some political clout since President Yudhoyono 
managed to strengthen his own party base with Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party) in 
his second term, thus pushing some influential Golkar members to other parties, it has 
played an important role as a representative of the collective interests of dominant 
domestic business groups, the majority of which have some kind of a property business 
division.
Third, the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) has a close 
partnership with the government and has become very influential in policy formulation 
(Sato 2011, 195).  Yudhoyono’s cabinet included many politicians with a business back-
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ground, such as Aburizal Bakrie (the chairman of KADIN 1994–2004) and Jusuf Kalla. 
The series of road maps for economic development formulated by KADIN have heavily 
influenced the government’s economic policy (Matsui 2005, 300).  It is also worth noting 
that Mohamad S. Hidayat, the former general secretary of REI (1989–92), was the 
 chairman of KADIN from 2004 to 2010 and also became the minister of industry in 
 Yudhoyono’s second cabinet (2009–14).  This testifies to the weight and heavy presence 
of property developers among Indonesian business circles and the top strata of ruling 
elites.17)
The consequence is very clear.  It is highly implausible that the government would 
take measures against big businesses controlling land.  These big businesses have 
slimmed down their huge debt through restructuring deals with IBRA and have retained 
control over vast amounts of land in the metropolitan region without much of a debt 
burden.  As long as urbanization pressure remains strong, they will continue to wield 
significant power to control and keep raising the price of land and houses in the region, 
regardless of whether tacit cartel agreements exist or not.  New large-scale projects such 
as superblocks, office buildings, shopping malls, and apartments continue to proliferate. 
Businesses have the confidence that their huge investments on acquired land and infra-
structure will never be disputed or disturbed by the government, at least in the foresee-
able future.  However, it is impossible for the new ruling elites to stabilize the dominance 
of big business without securing support from the wider urban masses.  How does this 
new coalition of ruling elites sustain the support of the middle to lower strata?
III Constructing New Social Order
1 Privatized Municipal Governments and Middle Class Formation
While securing their business interests via relations with the democratized central gov-
ernment, how do developers consolidate their position at the local level?  In the following 
argument, this author basically extends Firman’s (2004) suggestion and maintains that 
the developer-middle class alliance is building up another strong base for the stability of 
the new urban order.  In this respect, one of the important factors is that new town 
developers take on the dual role of property developers and a privatized “municipal 
government,” and, with the increase in the settled population, the weight of the latter 
role has been increasing both as an opportunity and as a burden.  During the New Order 
17) Also see Properti Indonesia (March 2004, 28), which interviewed M.S. Hidayat about the relationship 
between KADIN and the property industry.
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era, except for a few projects such as Bintaro Jaya and BSD, it was not end-buyers but 
speculators who led the residential property market (ibid.; Arai 2005).  As a result, even 
though houses were built and handed over to consumers, the majority of them were 
vacant or underutilized.  This “hollowness” of satellite cities made the developers’ dom-
inance fragile.  In the post-New Order era, however, the rapid expansion of retailers into 
these satellite cities (in the form of hypermarkets, malls, and trade centers18)) together 
with the improvement of access to Jakarta (such as new direct-connection roads to high-
ways) make these satellite cities comfortable and convenient enough for a large number 
of people to settle in.  As a result, in such areas as Serpong-Karawaci (South Tangerang), 
Cibubur-Cileungsi (Bogor), Cikarang, and Bekasi City (Bekasi), the population has grown 
rapidly.
Who are the people in-migrating to these new satellite cities?  The prices of houses 
in satellite cities vary greatly depending on the location, the targeted segment, and the 
scale of the projects.  However, those who can afford to buy a house in one of these satel-
lite cities are, as a whole, a relatively small proportion of the population in  Jabodetabek 
and collectively constitute the conspicuous core of the kelas menengah (middle class).  As 
Solvay Gerke pointed out, the middle-classes construct their identity by constantly dis-
tancing themselves from the poorer “Other.”
Typical in its formation, the culture of the ‘new middle class’ is one marked by an ongoing attempt 
to demarcate itself against the lower strata of the society.  Its formation is thus bounded in a com-
plex process of distancing itself from the poor ‘Other.’  In Indonesia, the ‘new middle class’ was in 
the strategic social position to construct hierarchies via the creation and promotion of a ‘modern’ 
lifestyle through consumption. (Gerke 2000, 145)
Developers capitalize on this desire for social distinction and upward orientation by 
providing an exclusive living environment (Rimmer and Dick 2009, 47–48).  Exclusive 
residential estates function to delineate class lines between the middle to upper classes 
and the lower “others,” first by filtering privileged residents from the other urban masses 
by a certain price level, and then by delineating the space inside from the surrounding 
local sociocultural context and recontextualizing it into an imagined cosmopolitan sphere. 
It is only with this spatial separation and articulation that people of varied ethnic, voca-
tional, and income backgrounds take on a similar appearance and somehow acquire a 
coherent identity as a middle class.  In this sense, the developers’ capital accumulation 
goes hand in hand with the formation of a middle class and the construction of a middle-
class lifestyle.
18) In Jabodetabek, a “trade center” is a type of shopping center where all or the majority of retail space 
is subdivided into hundreds of relatively small compartments and sold in lots.
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The price of houses functions to filter out those who live within a planned residen-
tial district of a satellite city.  In major satellite cities such as BSD City, Gading Serpong, 
and Alam Sutera (20–25 km radius from the center of Jakarta), the majority of houses 
available are being sold at more than Rp.1 billion.  Even the smallest and lowest-priced 
ones in the secondary market cost about Rp.600 million.19)  Assuming that one is buying 
one of these lowest-priced houses with a 20 percent down payment and an 80 percent 
mortgage, with a fixed interest rate of 9.5 percent and a payment period of 20 years, the 
monthly payment will be about Rp.4.7 million.  Assuming that a sustainable maximum 
loan payment is a third of monthly income, potential buyers need a monthly income of at 
least about Rp.14 million.  Lower-priced units are available only in more remote or less 
prestigious satellite cities or the small residential estates scattered around them.  For 
example, buying a small house for Rp.220 million in Citra Raya (about 35 km from the 
center of Jakarta) with the same assumptions as above requires a monthly income of 
about Rp.5 million.  We can thus assume that the lower limit for buying a modest house 
in a planned satellite city or residential estate is a stable monthly income of about Rp.5 
million.
How many Jabotabek residents meet this requirement?  A large-scale study by JICA, 
the Japanese official aid agency (together with the coordinating ministry of economic 
affairs of the Indonesian government), divides households in Jabodetabek into five income 
groups (CMEA and JICA 2012, 36) (Fig. 1).  The agency defines households with a 
monthly income of up to Rp.900,000 as “low income,” Rp.1–5.9 million as “medium 
income,” and more than Rp.6 million as “high income.”  JICA’s threshold of “low income” 
corresponds roughly with the official minimum wage in 2010 of Jakarta (Rp.1.18 million) 
and Banten Province (Rp.960,000).  This graph highlights several important points.  First, 
the average household income rose significantly between 2002 and 2010, and “low 
income” households declined from a quarter to less than 15 percent.  Second, households 
that can afford to buy a house from developers are still around 10 percent to 15 percent. 
The table bundles the monthly income of Rp.3–5.9 million into a single bracket, and hence 
does not specify the proportion of households with income above Rp.5 million.  However, 
even if we add a third of this income bracket to the “high-income” group, they as a whole 
19) Examples of housing prices here are loosely based on the search results of a property Web site 
(http://rumah123.com, accessed October 6, 2015) in early February 2014.  For example, a house 
(building 70 m2/ land 72 m2) in Nusa Loka District (one of the old, non-clustered districts) in BSD 
City was on sale for Rp.590 million (listing ID hos145285), while another house (B: 60 m2/ L: 78 m2) 
in Neo Catalonia cluster was priced at Rp.760 million (listing ID1029026).  In Citra Raya, a house 
with B: 21/L60 was Rp.185 million (hos1167187), and another one with B90/L72 was Rp.220 million 
(hos1150987).  The assumption of interest rate is based on KPR Bank Permata in early February 
2014.
ARAI K.464
comprise only the upper 15 percent of society.  This means that what I have viewed as 
the middle-class core is rather the upper strata in terms of income.  Their “middle-ness” 
should not be understood as average but as the embodiment of a social ideal type or 
exemplary center of lifestyle.  Third, JICA’s “medium income” households (not the 
above-mentioned “middle-class core”) constitute the actual majority in Jabodetabek 
(almost 80 percent in 2010).  Most of them probably still cannot afford to live in housing 
estates.  However, with the general trend of rising income, many of them—especially 
the upper half—must have felt that their purchasing power had improved and experienced 
rising expectations.  Many of those with Rp.3–5.9 million living in a kampung may well 
identify with the middle class or regard themselves as “middle class in the making.”  This 
corresponds with what Aiko Kurasawa calls “pseudo middle-class.”  Based on a series of 
detailed case studies in an urban kampung on the fringe of South Jakarta, she points out 
that there are many residents in urban kampung who have a strong upward orientation, 
pay keen attention to educational achievement, and display rational or selective consum-
erism.  They selectively appropriate the attitude, values, and lifestyle of the middle-class 
core while adjusting to the kampung’s social and economic environment (Kurasawa 2013, 
1–8).  This is a very heuristic observation in understanding the dynamics of class dif-
ferentiation in contemporary Jabodetabek.20)  In the following analysis, this author only 
20) Kurasawa’s “pseudo middle-class” is defined primarily by lifestyle and value, and income level is 
given secondary importance.  However, in explaining a typical image of this class, Kurasawa men-
tions that monthly household income is around Rp.3–5 million.  This also fits well with this paper’s 
analysis that Rp.5 million was the lower threshold of the middle-class core around 2010.
Fig. 1 Changes in Household Income
Source: CMEA and JICA (2012, 36)
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changes the term, calling them “semi-middle class” to avoid the negative connotation of 
“pseudo.”
Let us take the example of Bekasi regency to examine the size of the middle-class 
core from different data.  In Bekasi regency in 2009, there were 229,060 persons working 
in 788 manufacturing companies.  This accounted for 14.6 percent of the population of 
productive age (15 to 64 years old), which was about 1,568,924 (BPS Kabupaten Bekasi 
2010).  On the other hand, another study by BPS showed that it was generally only those 
above the levels of managers and supervisors (plus accountants and secretaries) who 
received a monthly income of more than Rp.2.5 million (BPS 2011, 62, 70, 78, 79).  We 
can assume that Rp.2.5 million was the lowest threshold of potential customers of devel-
opers’ housing, because if they got married and worked together, their combined monthly 
income could reach Rp.5 million.
However, this study does not tell us the percentage of managers and supervisors. 
Kensuke Miyamoto’s case study of three Japanese manufacturing companies in Bekasi 
in 2000 showed that those above the level of supervisors comprised only 5.2 percent of 
total employees (Miyamoto 2002, 146 Table 4-11).  Assuming that roughly 5 percent to 
10 percent of the manufacturing workers in Bekasi regency were above the supervisor 
level (supervisors, managers, and other professionals) in 2009, their number would be 
between 11,454 and 22,906.  In addition to this, we may also count some civil public 
servants (14,187) and schoolteachers (42,557) as stable wageworkers and hence potential 
consumers of developers’ housing.  Even if we sum them up all, their number would be 
around 68,000 to 80,000, or only about 5 percent of the population of productive age.  The 
actual percentage of those with real purchasing power for developers’ housing would be 
lower, because many of the above-mentioned people would not attain a monthly income 
of more than Rp.5 million; only those already married and having a dual-income household 
would.
Lastly, we have to add the manager class from the non-manufacturing sector (such 
as hotels and retail), other professionals (doctors, lawyers, etc.), successful businessmen, 
and the higher strata of military personnel to this wealthy population with real purchas-
ing power.  Unfortunately, this author does not have data on their number.  However, 
even if their total number rivaled those of the manufacturing sector and public servants 
plus teachers, the total population of those with purchasing power for developers’ hous-
ing would be between 5 percent and 10 percent of productive-age residents.  The propor-
tion would be higher in Jakarta and relatively wealthy cities such as Depok and South 
Tangerang.  However, together with the data from JICA, we can estimate that the propor-
tion of those eligible to form the middle-class core in Jabodetabek would be around 5 
percent to 15 percent of households, depending on the regency and municipality.
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To serve this limited but growing population, private developers provide various 
municipal services, such as the construction and maintenance of roads, supply of clean 
water, waste water disposal, landscaping and gardening, security service, shuttle bus 
transportation to Jakarta, and so on.  For example, BSD City, the largest satellite city, is 
managed by PT Bumi Serpong Damai Tbk, a listed company with 49 percent stake held 
by PT Sinarmas Land.  According to the company’s 2011 annual report, it had as many 
as 1,599 employees—35 top management, 185 managers, 604 staff, and 775 “non-staff”—
and had such divisions as planning, city infrastructure, estate management, landscape, 
nursery, and so on (PT Bumi Serpong Damai Tbk 2009, 13; 2011, 71).  In short,  Bodetabek 
today is characterized by the existence of dual governments—a public one and a priva-
tized one.  The public government greatly benefited financially from various economic 
activities in the privately managed satellite cities.  For example, about 80 percent of the 
income of Tangerang regency is earned through various permit fees (such as building 
permits) in Serpong, Cisauk, Kelapa Dua, Pagedangan, and Legok, where BSD City, 
Gading Serpong, and Lippo Karawaci are located.21) It would be difficult for public local 
governments to take over the role of these developers and continue to provide the same 
quality of services, even if the developers handed over all the above “municipal functions” 
to the former.  It is here that the interests of satellite city developers meet and overlap 
not only with those of local governments but also with those of settled residents who 
hope to keep the high quality of services, living environment, and asset value.  As a result, 
the increasing population of homeowners provides a kind of “constituency” for the con-
tinued presence of developers even long after the completion of residential areas.  On 
the other hand, these developers are profit-oriented private enterprises.  Naturally, what 
“municipal functions” they select and how they manage them follow the principles of 
profit-oriented business.
Satellite city developers often avoid installing infrastructure in existing settle-
ments (kampung) and instead develop planned districts named perumahan kluster (“clus-
tered housing estates” or gated communities) piece by piece.  The resulting land-use 
pattern is a patchwork of well-planned walled estates and existing kampung.  By confin-
ing the building of infrastructure to within the walled estates, developers and residents 
create a simple and direct relationship between the providers and customers of various 
services.  At the same time, the obvious difference in living environments within and 
outside the walled estates becomes a clear medium to demarcate between the middle 
class and the poorer “Other.”  Differences in income level, profession, and ethnic back-
21) “More Malls in Tangerang” (Tempo.co, August 27, 2013), accessed September 23, 2015, “Pendapa-
tan Retribusi IMB dan HO Lampaui Target” (Satelitnews, June 20, 2013), accessed June 4, 2015.
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ground among the residents are blurred by this strong contrast against outside kampung 
residents.
Taking the example of BSD City again, this satellite city consists of various “grand 
clusters” of about 40 to 70 hectares, each composed of multiple “clusters.”  Each cluster 
is a walled single-gate complex with 50 to a few hundred houses.  The grand clusters are 
often located side by side with existing settlements and administratively belong to local 
kelurahan (towns) and kecamatan (districts).  However, clusters’ residents rarely visit 
or deal with the town or district government offices.  More often, it is the privatized 
“municipal government” (i.e., the developer) that they find it necessary to negotiate with 
to improve or maintain the living environment; and for this purpose, they organize forum 
warga (residents’ forums).  All the examples above show how developers acquire a kind 
of legitimacy to function as a privatized “government” in return for providing a spatial 
foundation for the distinctive lifestyle and living environment for the aspiring middle to 
upper classes.
2 Widening Social Cleavages and Urban Problems
For those who cannot afford to buy a house in a walled residential estate or high-rise 
apartment building, the hurdle to homeownership has been rising, especially for those 
with a fixed salary.  Despite the official minimum wage being revised repeatedly, it has 
lagged far behind the rapid hikes of land prices in the metropolitan region.  Another bar-
rier to homeownership is that regular staff jobs decreased drastically after the massive 
layoffs during the Asian economic crisis.  As a compromise between labor movement 
groups and globally mobile capital, in 2003 a new labor law was introduced, enabling and 
encouraging companies to replace regular staff with fixed-term contract workers and 
outsourced workers (Arai 2011, 185–188).  Such changes of employment structure also 
impact the place of living, because regular staff can apply for mortgage loans while fixed-
term workers and agency workers generally cannot do so.
On the other hand, we have to realize that property development affects people’s 
lives not only through the price and control of land, but in more diverse ways.  With the 
rapid increase in the population with strong purchasing power, satellite cities, to some 
degree, have become a new source of job opportunities, even for those who cannot 
afford a house in them.  Construction and many related industries have enjoyed a boom. 
The mushrooming of shopping centers, hypermarkets, and numerous other retail shops 
has also created significant numbers of jobs in the retail and service sectors.  Various 
businesses targeting the growing middle class strata—restaurants, fashion retailers, 
auto sales, property brokerages, medical services, and so on—have also enjoyed a 
boom.  The scale of business activities has not yet reached the point of creating a huge 
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demand for office buildings within these satellite cities; most office workers living in them 
still commute daily to Jakarta.  However, the increase in business activity has already 
attracted enough business travelers to stimulate a boom in new hotel construction. 
Universities are also setting up new campuses or aggressively expanding existing cam-
puses, for example, Universitas Pelita Harapan (Lippo Karawaci), Swiss German Univer-
sity and Prasetiya Mulya Business School (BSD City), Universitas Multimedia Nusantara 
(Gading Serpong), Universitas Bina Nusantara (Alam Sutera), Universitas Pembangunan 
Jaya (Bintaro Jaya), President University (Kota Jababeka), and Institut Teknologi dan 
Sains Bandung (Kota Deltamas) (Housing Estate March 2011, 46–52).  As a result, exist-
ing kampung settlements in and around large satellite cities have become denser, receiv-
ing growing numbers of immigrants who cannot afford a home inside the residential 
estates.
The widening social cleavages create serious problems, including housing and traf-
fic congestion.  During the New Order, the government tried to resolve the housing 
shortage by facilitating the development of affordable landed housing (rumah sederhana) 
in satellite cities.  Large-scale development and mass production of housing were 
expected to have the advantages of scale and enable developers to cross-subsidize the 
cost of affordable housing.  A joint decree by three ministers in 1992, for example, obli-
gated each developer to build six affordable houses and three medium-priced houses for 
each luxury home.22)  However, without any effective sanctions against violation, the 
decree did not have enforcing power and large satellite-city developers generally skipped 
the obligation.  The advantages of scale were simply absorbed as business profit or by a 
corrupt bureaucracy (Firman 1996; Cowherd 2005).
In the post-New Order period, the development of affordable housing in Jabodetabek 
has generally been stagnant.  The government’s priority during the debt restructuring 
process was to recover loans from debtors rather than make fundamental revisions to 
the existing land-use plan.  As long as vast amounts of suburban land are under the con-
trol of about three dozen satellite-city developers, it is obvious that most of the land will 
be marketed to the middle to upper classes at the highest possible price.  There is no 
incentive for developers to build and sell affordable housing with minimum profit margins, 
particularly since the policy supports for affordable housing have decreased rather than 
increased under the post-New Order government.  In addition, in the highly decentralized 
post-New Order government structure, various ministries and local governments move 
22) Surat Keputusan Bersama Menteri Dalam Negeri, Menteri Pekerjaan Umum, Menteri Negara 
Perumahan Rakyat tentang Pedoman Pembangunan Perumahan dan Permukiman Dengan 
 Lingkungan Hunian Yang Berimbang.
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more independently and sporadically for their own interests.  The government has thus 
failed to provide a coordinated and integrated business environment for affordable 
housing developers, such as securing the budget for the subsidization of low-interest 
mortgage loans (Arai 2003).
Because the government and private developers have not provided enough afford-
able housing, those who cannot afford to buy expensive houses within planned housing 
estates tend to concentrate in existing kampung settlements in and around large satellite 
cities.  Statistical data of West Java in 2009 show that a relatively high percentage of 
households live in their own home or the home of parents or siblings.  For example, 73 
percent of households in Bogor regency and 78 percent in Bekasi regency live in their 
own home, while 11.7 percent of Bogor regency households live in the home of their 
parents or siblings (BPS Provinsi Jawa Barat 2010, 213, 214).  These figures are surpris-
ingly high in view of the general price level of commercial housing, suggesting that 
inheritance and informal housing in existing kampung areas have played a major role in 
meeting the housing demand.  On the other hand, satellite-city developers have, through 
piecemeal infrastructure development, effectively skipped the burden of improving the 
infrastructure in these kampung settlements and hence betrayed the original policy 
justifica tion for large-scale development.
A growing immigrant population further burdens the poor infrastructure in settle-
ments in rapidly urbanizing areas.  Available statistical data on West Java Province in 
2010 show that almost two-thirds of the residents of Depok city (63.85 percent) and 
Bekasi city (63.12 percent) were immigrants from outside.  This means that there were 
about 1.47 million immigrants in Bekasi city and 1.11 million in Depok city (BPS Provinsi 
Jawa Barat 2011, 66, 67).23)  In these cities, the percentages of those living in rented rooms 
or rented houses are much higher than in regency areas: 26.66 percent (103,687) house-
holds in Depok city and 20.34 percent (114,542) in Bekasi city (BPS Provinsi Jawa Barat 
2010, 213, 214).  Even in regency areas, which tend to be more rural, 22 percent of 
residents in Bogor and 36.7 percent in Bekasi were immigrants.
Worsening traffic congestion is another logical consequence of the population 
increase in large satellite cities and their surroundings in Bodetabek.  During the three 
decades of the New Order, neither the government nor private businesses invested in 
opening new commuter lines between Jakarta and Bodetabek.  Limited investments in 
23) Assuming that the average size of immigrant households is 3.35 persons, about 44,000 households 
in Bekasi and 33,100 households in Depok city are made up of immigrant families.  The average 
household size in Jabotabek is roughly 4 persons, but in the case of Bekasi regency in 2009 it was 
3.35 persons.  Because the immigrant population can include a relatively high percentage of singles 
and young couples, their average household size could be much smaller than 3.35.
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the train sector were used to improve the existing lines inherited from the Dutch colonial 
period.  In contrast, the New Order government constructed four new highways  (Jagorawi, 
Jakarta-Merak, Jakarta-Cikampek, and Outer Ring Road).  Almost all the large satellite 
cities were developed to capitalize on the improved accessibility between Bodetabek 
and Jakarta via these new highways.  From the very beginning, developers assumed that 
the majority of residents would use private cars as a basic mode of transportation, and 
they designed the cities accordingly.  Indeed, many residents do commute via their own 
private cars.  According to JICA’s studies, from 2002 to 2010 the volume of traffic from 
 Bodetabek to Jakarta increased 1.5 times, becoming about 1.1 million trips a day (JICA 
2012, 2–63) (Fig. 2).  Registered passenger cars in Jadetabek (without the data on Bogor) 
doubled to more than 2 million between 2000 and 2008 (Table 3).  Among high-income 
households, 52.5 percent of trips in 2002 were made in private passenger cars (JICA 
2004, ii) (Fig. 3).  In 2010, 44 percent of their travel was still by private car (JICA 2012, 
3–8) (Fig. 4).
With the rise in incomes and proliferation of auto loans, middle-income (about 80 
percent of Jabotabek) and low-income households have adapted to the private-car ori-
Fig. 2 Increase in Commuter Traffic from Bodetabek to Jakarta; 2002–10
Source: JICA (2012, 2–63)
Table 3 Motorization in DKI Jakarta, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi (Excluding army and CD [diplomatic] 
vehicles)
No. of Registered  
Vehicles (,000)
Registered Vehicles  
per 1,000 persons
Growth Rate of Registered  
Vehicles (% p.a.)
1990 2000 2005 2008 1990 2000 2005 2008 90–’00 00–’05 05–’08
Motorcycle 804 1,620 4,647 6,766 47 77 197 258 7.3 23.5 13.3
Passenger Car 486 1,053 1,767 2,035 29 50 75 78 8.0 10.9 4.8
Truck 190 334 500 539 11 16 21 21 5.8 8.4 2.5
Bus 169 254 317 309 10 12 13 12 4.1 4.5 –0.8
Total 1,649 3,260 7,230 9,648 97 156 306 369 7.1 17.3 10.1
Source: Excerpt from JICA (2012, 2–5, Table 2.1.3)
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ented urban structure by procuring motorcycles.  The number of registered motorcycles 
in Jadetabek (without the data on Bogor) jumped from 1.62 million in 2000 to 6.76 million 
in 2008, meaning 258 vehicles per 1,000 persons (Table 3).  Considering that the average 
household size in this region is about four persons, motorcycles already outnumber 
households and have shifted from being a luxury item to being an essential commodity. 
This has resulted in a drastic decline in public transport.  In 2002, the share of buses as 
a mode of commuting was 38 percent, while motorcycles accounted for 21 percent and 
private cars 12 percent.  In 2010, the share of buses dropped to 17 percent (a drop of 
Fig. 3 Daily Mode Share by Income Group in 2002 (% of trips)
Source: JICA (2004, ii)
Fig. 4 Daily Mode Share by Income Group in 2010 (% of trips)
Source: JICA (2012, 3–8)
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more than half in eight years), while the share of motorcycles doubled to 41 percent, 
making it the dominant mode of commuting (CMEA and JICA 2012, 38) (Fig. 5).  Espe-
cially among low-income households, the share of motorcycle traffic was the highest (56 
percent).  Although this may be an effective adaptation strategy for individual households, 
the collective outcome has been a devastating vicious circle.  The average travel speed 
in Jakarta during weekday peak hours is 20 km or even below 10 km per hour on many 
arterial roads in and around the CBD area (JICA 2012, 2–26).  The drop in car usage 
among high-income households from 2002 to 2010 suggests that even these people may 
give up some of the comfort of passenger cars because motorcycles run faster on con-
gested roads.  The heavy congestion heightens the financial and physical burden on 
commuters.  The estimated opportunity cost of traffic jams (wasted fuel, air pollution, 
and loss of time and productivity) varies depending on various assumptions, but one 
estimate gives a figure of about Rp.48 trillion annually (Simanungkalit 2009, 50).24)
Another problem is poor linkages among satellite cities.  Until recently, developers 
paid attention only to the infrastructure inside satellite cities, and how to improve access 
to Jakarta.  Usually, the main roads within satellite cities are wide and well maintained. 
Many developers are also willing to invest heavily to connect their projects directly with 
highways to Jakarta, but they rarely pay attention to synchronizing their development 
with neighboring “competitor” projects.  As satellite cities grow, the traffic between them 
24) In comparison, the gross regional product of Jakarta was about Rp.371 trillion in 2009 (from the Web 
site of Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board, “Display Ekonomi PDRB DKI JAKARTA,” 
accessed September 23, 2015 (http://regionalinvestment.bkpm.go.id/newsipid/ekonomipdrb.
php?ia=31&is=43).
Fig. 5 Changes in Mode Transportation for Commuting
Source: CMEA and JICA (2012, 38)
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is already overwhelming existing road networks.25)
In summary, the restructuring of urban space in the post-New Order era is intri-
cately related to sharpening social cleavages.  On the one hand, there is the new tendency 
of many satellite cities in Bodetabek growing to be lively, populated regional cores, mak-
ing the metropolitan region more polycentric.  However, this positive effect is greatly 
offset by a steep rise in the prices of land and housing, numbers of cars and motorcycles, 
and piecemeal infrastructure development by private developers, which betrays the 
original policy justification of large-scale development.  For many people, life in the post-
New Order metropolis is the same old story of living in the increasingly squeezed urban 
kampung neighborhood, or commuting long distances (though not in a packed bus now, 
but by motorcycle) through steadily deteriorating congestion, and working under un-
stable terms, such as fixed-term contract work.
IV The Resilience of the Post-New Order Regime
1 Narrowing the Cleavages, Containing the Discontent
After examining the close relationship between spatial reorganization and widening social 
cleavages in post-New Order Jabodetabek, the next question to be asked is how the 
regime addresses or suppresses these spatial-social cleavages.  There have been many 
attempts on the part of ruling elites to contain serious social disturbances.  These 
attempts will be briefly outlined below.
First, there are efforts by the ruling political and economic elites to increase the 
beneficiaries of economic prosperity through improvements in public transportation and 
the provision of affordable housing.  In this respect, a democratic framework in the post-
New Order era is given all the more important roles to represent the needs and desires 
of the semi-middle to lower classes, because their interests cannot be represented by 
the profit-oriented “privatized governments.”  So far, the results have been mixed.  Pol-
icies of the central government and newly strengthened local governments have often 
conflicted with each other.  Even if the concerned parties bear goodwill toward each other, 
coordination and cooperation are not easy.
As for transportation, the post-New Order government significantly shifted the ori-
entation away from private car ownership toward the improvement of public transport. 
The improvement has been tackled on four fronts: Bus Rapid Transit (busway), com-
25) It is worth noting that BSD City and Gading Serpong worked together to build a direct road between 
the two cities.  Hudalah and Firman also report that seven industrial estates in Bekasi decided to 
coordinate and jointly develop infrastructure (Hudalah and Firman 2012, 46).
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muter train, Mass Rapid Transit (MRT), and Light Rail Transit (LRT).  Bus Rapid Tran-
sit is operated by a public company under the Jakarta provincial government.  It started 
in 2004 under the Sutiyoso governorship and has quickly expanded operation into 12 
lines.  The number of daily passengers increased from 47,589 in 2004 to 238,184 in 2010 
(JICA 2012, 2–46; see also Kusno 2010, Chapter 2; Salim and Firman 2011).  Although 
the increase is impressive, this is still a tiny portion of about 18.8 million trips undertaken 
daily in Jakarta (JICA 2012, 3–5).  Moreover, the busway has not yet expanded into major 
parts of Bodetabek.  The Indonesian Railway is also slowly expanding and improving its 
commuter train services between Jakarta and Bodetabek areas.  As for the MRT, the first 
line between Kampung Bandan and Lebak Bulus (North-South line) is under construction. 
It is planned to open between 2018 and 2020, while the second line (East-West line) 
between Balaraja (in Tangerang) and Cikarang (in Bekasi) is planned to be completed in 
2024–27.26)
LRT is a new project incepted by Jokowi-Ahok governorship.  More than eight lines 
are being planned, aiming to connect major sub-centers of whole Jakarta, Soekarno-Hatta 
Airport, and some parts of Bogor, Depok and Bekasi.  The construction of the first phase 
has already started in 2015, planned to connect Cibubur and Bekasi Timur to Dukuh Atas, 
the transportation hub of Jakarta’s CBD in 2018.27)
The basic framework of these new transportation policies has been formulated 
through the joint efforts of the central government, local governments, and foreign aid 
agencies (such as JICA), and, except for the newly incepted LRT, the overall policy ori-
entation has been consistent over the past eight or nine years.  However, the implemen-
tation has been affected by conflicting interests, lack of coordination, and contestation 
among various actors.  For example, taking over the governorship from Sutiyoso in 2007, 
Fauzi Bowo prioritized the progress of MRT projects over the betterment of busway 
services.  While the busway’s lines were steadily expanded, the quality of vehicles and 
services declined.  In turn, when Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was elected new governor in 
2012, the re-examination of the MRT and new highway projects were among his first 
policy agendas, to sustain the enormous popularity and support he had been shown dur-
ing the election campaign.  It took several months before Jokowi was convinced of the 
feasibility of the MRT program and became more enthusiastic.  Overall, the government 
26) Tentang PT. MRT Jakarta (http://www.jakartamrt.com/informasi-mrt/tentang-mrt/), accessed June 
2, 2015.
27) For LRT, see the following articles: “Kisah Jokowi-Ahok di Balik Pembangunan LRT di Jakarta” 
(Kompas.com, September 9, 2015),“LRT Tahap I Diharapkan Atasi Kemacetan dari Bekasi dan 
Cibubur” (Kompas.com, September 9, 2015), “Presiden: Akhiri Polemik Kereta Ringan” (Kompas.
com, August 19, 2015), all accessed September 24, 2015.
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is still struggling to counter the drastic shift from public transportation to motorcycles 
over the last decade.
As for housing policy, one of the most noteworthy moves was the central govern-
ment’s initiative to provide 1,000 towers of affordable apartments (rumah susun  sederhana 
milik, or rusunami) with a price of Rp.144 million in five years in major cities in Indone-
sia, 60 percent of which was said to be built in Jakarta.  This program started in the first 
cabinet of the Yudhoyono presidency.  Jusuf Kalla, a Golkar politician with a business 
background and the vice president at the time, strongly promoted this policy and urged 
developers to invest in rusunami.  Partly due to his strong pressure, the Agung Podomoro 
Group and several other developers decided to invest in rusunami projects, such as 
 Gading Nias Residences in Kelapa Gading (North Jakarta; about 6,000 units) and Kalibata 
Residences in Kalibata (South Jakarta; about 15,000 units).  However, the central govern-
ment’s initiative received a skeptical response from the Jakarta provincial government 
under the Fauzi Bowo governorship.  While the central government (the vice presidents 
and the office of the state minister of people’s housing) promised developers some incen-
tives, such as a special bonus in floor-area ratio and a more simplified process for various 
permits, the Jakarta government found it incompatible with local decrees and blockaded 
six ongoing projects.28)  This incident showed that even a national policy strongly pro-
moted by the vice president could not be implemented consistently if it was opposed by 
a local government.  Developers quickly lost interest in the rusunami business.  Once 
Kalla left the cabinet in 2009, the policy quickly failed to maintain whatever support it 
had from the government and became deadlocked.
Another important element of the post-New Order regime is the development of 
privatized security (Honna 2013, 181–196).  The rapid growth of office buildings, apart-
ments, shopping malls, and gated communities has greatly increased the demand for 
private security guards.  Developers also sometimes mobilize an army of guards during 
conflicts over land.  On the other hand, the post-New Order government has deregulated 
both the setting up of new security companies and the outsourcing of security services, 
resulting in the mushrooming of new security companies.  Masaaki Okamoto’s study 
provides a noteworthy case of the tie-up between the Agung Podomoro Group, the top 
28) For a chronology of the blockade, see the following articles: “Soal Penyegelan Rusunami Kalibata 
Bisa Diselesaikan” (Kompas.com, April 8, 2009), “Enam Proyek Rusunami di Jakarta Disegel” 
(Kompas.com, April 30, 2009), “Segera Dibentuk, Tim Penyelesasian Perizinan Rusun (Kompas.
com, April 29, 2009), “DKI Percepat Proses Perizinan Rusunami” (Kompas.com, May 18, 2009), 
“Pemprov DKI Beri Keringanan Pembayaran Denda Rusunami” (Kompas.com, May 29, 2009), 
“Pemerintah Daerah Persulit Bangun Rumah Susun” (Merdeka.com, April 15, 2013).  For the 
deadlock of the policy, see “Program 1.000 ‘Tower’ Mati Suri” (Kompas.com, March 9, 2012).  All 
the Web articles above were last accessed September 23, 2015.
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apartment developer, and BPPKB, a mass-based security organization (Okamoto 2006). 
BPPKB was set up in July 1998 and presided over by Noer Indradjaja, the head of the 
legal section of Sunter Agung Co. Ltd. (a holding company of the Agung Podomoro 
Group).  Both Agung Podomoro and BPPK have experienced phenomenal growth in the 
post-New Order era; while the Agung Podomoro group has built many apartments, BPPK 
has provided services in land acquisition and security.
The growth of the private security industry is a privatized form of an answer to the 
challenge of maintaining social order and security in the growingly polarized urban envi-
ronment.  It also functions as a social stabilizer because it contributes greatly to an 
increase in employment.  As Jun Honna has pointed out, this privatization process has 
close relations with the co-optation and incorporation of organized thugs, locally known 
as preman.  Preman groups accommodate those who are excluded from the fruit of pres-
ent economic growth and give them a sort of order.  It seems that for the ruling elites in 
the administration, the kind of hierarchy and order preman create is better suited to 
controlling and co-opting than allowing an unorganized urban mass that might explode at 
any time in an uncontrolled manner.
The political mobilization of Islam has also been tried in various ways to suppress 
the discontent and to attract support for the regime.  Islam is a common denominator for 
both sides of the social cleavage in this region, where roughly 85 percent of residents are 
Muslim.  One example is the 2012 gubernatorial election of the Jakarta provincial govern-
ment.  Incumbent Governor Fauzi in many ways represented the existing establishment 
(of ruling coalition parties, bureaucrats, leaders of mass organizations, and  religious 
authority).  Ken Miichi’s study exemplifies how thoroughly Islam was exploited as a 
political resource by Fauzi’s election campaign (Miichi 2014).  As he pointed out, Fauzi’s 
appeal to Islam was indeed effective in luring a significant portion of relatively lower-
educated and less affluent (mainly Betawi, and also some Javanese) voters, thus provid-
ing another example that the banner of Islam is politically very effective in  covering wide 
divisions among classes and sustaining the existing socio-political  hierarchy.
2 Change and Dynamics: Semi-middle Class Pressure and Strong Leadership
As has already been mentioned, the democratized political frameworks in the post-New 
Order era, with all their limits, are given an important role to accommodate the aspira-
tions and discontent of the wider masses, while dominant urban governance is highly 
privatized.  How, then, should we evaluate the victory of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Basuki 
Purnama (Ahok) in the 2012 gubernatorial election, and the subsequent victory of Jokowi 
and Jusuf Kalla in the 2014 presidential election?  The factors behind the victory of the 
Jokowi-Ahok duo have been analyzed in great detail from multiple perspectives, such as 
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by Okamoto (2014), Abdul Hamid (2014), Ahmad Suaedy (2014), Wahyu Prasetyawan 
(2014), and Miichi (2014).  Here, this author would just like to add a tentative hypothesis 
to stimulate further discussion.  First, the victory of Jokowi and Ahok may suggest the 
potential influence of the semi-middle class.  Miichi pointed out that ethnic Betawi and 
some lower-educated (and probably less affluent) Javanese voters tended to prioritize 
religious and ethnic affinity, while the more educated (and probably more affluent) people 
tended to support Jokowi-Ahok (Miichi 2014, 67–68).  On the other hand, what I call the 
“middle-class core” is wealthy and well educated but comprises only around 5–15 percent 
of the population in Jabodetabek, hence it is too small in terms of voting power.  The 
“semi-middle class” are probably much larger29) and can have a bigger voice in elections. 
They generally live in conventional kampung neighborhoods and hence have much to 
gain from improvements in infrastructure, housing, and other public services.  Living 
side by side with the lower class, they can position themselves as the new mainstream 
in society, representing the grievances of the wider masses.
Second, Jokowi and Ahok as governor show a clear orientation to rebuilding and 
reasserting the role of the public sector to counter the various problems exacerbated by 
the highly privatized urban developments.  Most of their high-profile policies have been 
targeted at low-income people, such as direct cash subsidies for students from low-
income households, free medical services for poor families, and relocation of slum 
residents to better-equipped rental apartments.  Other policies, such as improvement 
of busways and other public transport, also seem to target the semi-middle to lower 
classes: the benefits of these policies are at best indirect to the middle-class core, who 
can afford to buy good living environments and amenities from developers-cum-privatized 
governments.
As for the issue of housing, for example, the duo has visibly been paying great atten-
tion to the housing needs of the lower classes.  Being aware that even the lowest-priced 
apartment unit would not be affordable for the lower classes, their policy so far has 
focused primarily on rental apartments (rumah susun sederhana sewa, or rusunawa). 
They have devoted significant amounts of time and energy to directly negotiate with 
residents who occupy the banks of flood-prone rivers and reservoirs about relocating to 
public rental apartments.  Most of these public apartments were planned and constructed 
during the terms of Sutiyoso and Fauzi Bowo, but they did not receive any serious atten-
tion and lack decent facilities such as road access, public transportation, educational 
facilities, and shopping places.  Compounded with rampant mismanagement and corrup-
29) I cannot provide an estimate of their number, because “semi-middle class” is not defined solely in 
terms of income or specific professions but also includes lifestyle and upward orientation.
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tion, many buildings were left deserted or appropriated by residents who did not meet 
the proper criteria.30)  During the first year of their term, Jokowi and Ahok made the most 
of these existing stocks of housing, upgrading them to make them livable.  They also 
disciplined the management of existing public apartments, discharging corrupt officials 
and evicting wealthier residents who had illegally appropriated the units.  Their painstak-
ing approach has started bearing fruit, and many of the occupants of riverbanks or reser-
voirs are moving to rusunawa, making it easier for the government to dredge the rivers 
and expand the reservoirs, hence decreasing the risk of flooding.31)
As for the traffic problem, Jokowi and Ahok have obviously tried hard to encourage 
as many people as possible to shift from private cars to public transport.  To speed up 
the process, they have paid great attention to the improvement of the busway, such as 
rapid upgrading of the number of buses and reorganizing the operators.  Since Jokowi 
became the President, they have cooperated together and exerted leadership in coordi-
nating various public agencies to realize the newly incepted LRT.32)  All of the above-
mentioned measures need time to bring meaningful changes to the general housing and 
traffic condition.  Until now, the leaders’ strong leadership and commitment to resolve 
the issues gave a sense of the process speeding up.  It also showed that, equipped with 
a strong leadership and clear orientation, a local government could have the clout to 
improve the living conditions of the urban masses and narrow the social cleavages.  How-
ever, the importance of leadership also means that the momentum of change can be 
easily lost with a change in governorship.
30) For the condition of rusunawa under Fauzi’s governorship, see “11 Rusun di Jakarta Terbengkalai” 
(PosKotaNews.com, May 26, 2013), “Rusun di Cengkareng Banyak ‘Hantunya’” (PosKotaNews.
com, January 19, 2012), “Ada Kabar Mau Dikunjungi Ahok, Rusun di Cengkareng Buru-buru 
 Diperbaiki” (PosKotaNews.com, February 4, 2013), “Isu Anak Hilang Dibawa Gendruwo Gegerkan 
Rusun Penggilingan” (PosKotaNews.com, December 13, 2013), “Pemerintah Daerah Persulit  Bangun 
Rumah Susun” (Merdeka.com, April 15, 2013).  All the Web articles above were last accessed 
September 23, 2015.  Data Mengenai Rumah Susun Yang Telah Di Bangundan Belum Dihuni Di 
Provinsi DKI Jakarta lists the vacant rusunawa as of December 2011 (a document in the databank 
of the official homepage of Jakarta provincial government [www.jakarta.go.id/v2/bankdata/listings/
details/1994], accessed October 6, 2015).
31) For an example of disciplining measures, see “20 Unit Rusun Marunda dan 200 unit Rusun Tipar 
Cakung disegel” (Merdeka.com, May 24, 2013, accessed September 23, 2015).  For examples of 
relocation, see “Pindah ke Rusun, Warga Sentiong Ucapkan Terima Kaish kepada Jokowi” (Kompas.
com, February 10, 2014, accessed September 23, 2015), “Citizen Relocation Process to Pinus Elok 
Flat Finished, Jokowi Says” (Beritajakarta.com, October 3, 2013, accessed on June 2, 2015), “Warga 
Bantaran Kali Sentiong Pindah ke Rusunawa” (Beritajakarta.com, February 8, 2014, accessed on 
September 23, 2015).
32) For example, see “Kisah Jokowi-Ahok di Balik Pembangunan LRT di Jakarta” (Kompas.com, 
 September 9, 2015) accessed September 23, 2015.
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Third, the ascent of Jokowi and Kalla into the presidency creates a unique arrange-
ment of political leadership, and that may be helpful in tackling urban issues of  Jabodetabek, 
especially housing.  It is noteworthy that before becoming the president and vice presi-
dent in 2014, both Jokowi and Kalla had expended considerable time and energy on the 
issue of urban housing.  As already mentioned, Kalla campaigned for the construction of 
1,000 towers of affordable apartments in the first cabinet of the Yudhoyono presidency. 
However, he was frustrated by the resistance of the Jakarta administration, then headed 
by Fauzi Bowo.  Kalla was cut from the second Yudhoyono cabinet in 2009, and he also 
lost the top position in the Golkar party, while Fauzi Bowo continued to enjoy strong 
support from Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party.  When Jokowi became a candidate in the 
Jakarta gubernatorial election, Kalla openly supported him, defying the party line of 
 Golkar (headed by Aburizal Bakrie), which had decided to support Fauzi.33)  Soon after 
Jokowi won and became the governor, Jakarta was hit by heavy flooding in early 2013. 
This pushed the issue of housing to the foreground, with flood refugees to be housed and 
occupants of riverbanks and water reservoirs to be relocated for future flood prevention. 
These events and experiences foreshadowed the 2015 presidential election, when Kalla 
became Jokowi’s running mate while Bakrie’s Golkar chose to support the opponents 
Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa.  Now, it seems that both the central and Jakarta govern-
ments have leaderships that are willing to work together to increase the supply of afford-
able apartments.34)  However, it is too early to say whether the new political arrangement 
will help to overcome the difficulties of coordination and bring substantive improvements 
to the various urban problems in Jabodetabek.
33) For Kallas’s support to Jokowi in the gubernatorial election, see “Alasan Jusuf Kalla Dukung Jokowi” 
(Tempo.co, August 6, 2012, accessed on June 2, 2015).
34) For the comments on housing policies (especially those affecting affordable apartments) by Jusuf 
Kalla before the presidential election campaign, see “JK Optimis Jokowi Dapat Atasi Banjir” 
 (Jusufkalla.info, January 19, 2014), “Jakarta Banjir, JK Sindir Jokowi Soal Rusun ‘1.000 Tower’” 
(Liputan6.com, February 5, 2014).  For the campaign promise, see “Jokowi-JK Akan Bangun 5.000 
Menara Rusun” (Kompas.com, June 11, 2014), “Jokowi-JK Bakal Nasionalkan Program Kampung 
Deret” (Republika Online, June 13, 2014), “Jusuf Kalla janji bangun rumah susun untuk buruh” 
 (Antaranews.com, June 21, 2014).  For Jokowi-Kalla’s move after the election, see “Jokowi Pilih 
Urus Rusun ketimbang Gugatan Prabowo ke MK” (Kompas.com, August 6, 2014), “Pemerintah 
akan permudah izin proyek permukiman kelas bawah” (Antaranews.com, November 13, 2014), 
“Jokowi Sebut DKI Punya Kemampuan Bangun Ribuan Rusun” (Jpnn.com, April 29, 2015).  All the 
Web articles above were last accessed on June 2, 2015.
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Conclusion
This paper has provided a brief political-economic analysis to examine the characteristics 
of the post-New Order era from the perspective of urban development in the metropoli-
tan region, by addressing several important points.  First, by showing a table of major 
satellite city projects before and after the New Order, this paper argues that the basic 
patterns of urban development have not changed profoundly.  Rather, what has appeared 
is a modified reuse of the patterns of the New Order.  The policies of large-scale, privately 
developed satellite cities and the oligopolistic control of the land and housing market in 
Bodetabek have persisted, although the rise and fall of some business actors have 
 modified the composition of the oligopoly.  Previous studies on large satellite cities in 
 Jabodetabek have not shown a comparison of the situations before and after the regime 
change, as detailed as Table 1 of this paper.  The mushrooming of new buildings in CBD 
and sub-CBD areas have also further strained the density without changing the basic city 
structure established during the New Order.
Second, this paper argues that the continuation in the pattern of urban development 
owes greatly to the developers’ ability to organize themselves and protect their collective 
interests through business associations such as REI and KADIN, and also to the fact that 
developers have deepened ties with dominant political parties and thus have succeeded 
in having representatives of their voice in the newly empowered parliament.  In addi-
tion, politicians from a business background (including property development) now 
occupy the top strata of the central government, and this makes it easier for business 
circles to reflect their interests in the government’s economic policy.  Previous studies 
on  Jabodetabek tended to focus on either geographic, demographic, or social aspects and 
hence bypass the political dimension of how private developers sustained support for the 
concentration of land resources into their hands after the total meltdown of the property 
industry around 1998 and the collapse of Suharto’s New Order.
Third, this study points out that the developers’ capital accumulation and the spatial 
articulation of the middle class go hand in hand, having created a de facto alliance between 
developers and the middle-class core.  In most cases, it is only after the New Order era 
that a significant number of residents settled into these satellite cities and made them 
“real” inhabited cities.  Now, Jakarta is surrounded by Bodetabek, with dozens of satellite 
cities characterized by dual governments—public and privatized.  These satellite cities, 
each more than 500 ha, are developed and managed by private companies as profit- 
oriented businesses.  The population with high purchasing power is rapidly increasing, 
and its needs are well represented in the spatial structures and the management of these 
privatized cities.  On the other hand, the commercially unviable semi-middle and lower 
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classes are spatially alienated, and their needs are largely ignored under the highly priva-
tized urban governance.  Their living environments are poorly managed by the public 
governments, and their adaptation to the car-oriented urban structure has exacerbated 
the traffic gridlock.
Fourth, this paper points out several components of the post-New Order regime 
that function to cover the social cleavages, such as the rapid growth of the privatized 
security industry, co-optation of large preman groups, and political mobilization of Islamic 
symbols.  While both the central and local governments have failed to significantly ameli-
orate the hardship of excluded classes, these components help to maintain security and 
order, alleviating the tension from widening social cleavages.  Previous studies generally 
discussed these topics separately from the spatial dimension of post-New Order regime 
formation.
Fifth, this paper points out that the dominant spatial-class articulation largely fails 
to incorporate the growing population of the semi-middle class.  While they are highly 
upward oriented and influenced by the hegemonic values and lifestyle embodied by the 
middle-class core, they are excluded from the dominant developer-middle class alliance. 
Under the democratic setting of the post-Suharto regime, they can express their discon-
tent toward the status quo through their voting and other forms of support to politicians, 
adding dynamics and complexities to the political landscape.
Sixth, the existence of a public and private “dual government,” along with the rela-
tionship between the newly strengthened local governments and the central government, 
makes a coordinated approach to the urban problems more challenging.  For example, 
the failure of Kalla’s initiative to provide massive amounts of rusunami showed both the 
responsiveness of some political elites to the public aspirations, and the difficulty of effec-
tive implementation.  On the other hand, Jakarta’s new governor Jokowi and his vice 
governor and successor Ahok have consciously readdressed the distortions of preceding 
urban development and the imbalances between privately managed spaces and publicly 
managed areas.  Experiences of the past few years show that they have tackled issues 
that needed to be addressed.  This implies that the leadership of local governments does 
matter.  Jokowi’s enormous popularity as the governor subsequently made him the 
strong est candidate in the presidential election, and finally led to the presidency.  Although 
this underlines the importance of the issues of the capital city in shaping the future agenda 
on a national scale, we have yet to see the lasting legacy of this new political leadership 
arrangement on the urban issues of Jabodetabek.
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